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§ 1688, page 467
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JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to §
78-2a-3(2)(j) Utah Code Annotated.
- ii -

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
I.

Does a trial court have jurisdiction to enter judgment

against a non party to a suit without service of summons or the
non party's agreement to be made a party to the action and to
enter a judgment against him?
deference,

Ron

Case

Roofing

Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah
II.

Correction of error standard, no
and

Asphalt

Paving,

Inc. v.

1989).

Can a trial court summarily enter judgment against a

non party on the pursuant to a disputed stipulation? Id.
STATUES AND RULES
All of these authorities, as well certain key cases are
included in the Appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

i.
entered

Nature of the case.
by

the

Third

This appeal results from a judgment

District

Court,

Judge

Pat

B.

Brian

presiding, against William B. Hill ("HILL") personally though he
was never

a party

to the action and was not served with a

summons.

ii.

Course of proceedings.

The procedural history of this

case is as follows.
Initial Complaint - In 1985, Steven and Fred Hays ("HAYS"),
plaintiffs/ respondents, initiated an action against defendant,
- iii -

an entity known as Mountain Equipment Sales and Leasing Company
("MSEL").

R. 00002-00005

Default Judgment - Later in 1985 Hays a default judgment was
entered against MSEL.

R. 00012-00013.

Attempt to execute on nonparty - Approximately August, 1988
Hays attempted to collect on its judgment by executing

against

personal vehicles of Kerry G. Smith ("SMITH") and William E. Hill
even

though

neither

was party

to the lawsuit.

R.

00019 and

00025.
Order

to

show

cause

- About

February,

1989, an Order

to

Appear and Show Cause why Hill and Smith should not be required
to produce the vehicles was entered by Judge Brian.

R. 00021.

Order to show cause hearing - On January 19, 1990, a hearing
was held on the Order

to Show Cause.

agreed to hold an evidentiary hearing.

At that time the Court
R. 00036

Evidentiary hearing - On May 31, 1990, an evidentiary hearing
was held.

The hearing having been continued from April 11, 1990.

R. 00045.
Purpose of evidentiary hearing to determine status of Hill The hearing was for the purpose ^r determining whether Hill was a
partner of MESL.

R. 00103.

Court finding that Hill was a partner

and that Hays could

proceed against Hill's personal assets - The Court held that Hill
was a partner and ordered that an evidentiary hearing be set for
December

11,

1990

to

determine

the

- iv -

amount

of

Hays'

default

judgment against MESL.
could

execute

against

evidentiary hearing.

The court further ordered that the Hays
Hill's

assets

at

the conclusion

of the

R. 00105.

Hearing to determine the amount of judgment - The December,
1990 hearing was continued to January 16, 1991.

At the January

hearing a stipulation was reached and read into the record as to
the amount of the judgment.
Objection

to

court's

R.

00107

prior

determination

that

Hays

could

proceed against Hill's personal assets and motion to strike and
clarify

- Prior

to an order

being signed with respect to the

stipulation reached on January 16, 1991, a motion was filed by
Hill.

The motion sought to strike the portion of the court order

that Hays could execute upon Hill's personal assets.

The motion

further sought clarification by the court, to wit, having found
that Hill was a partner of MSEL, whether any judgment obtained
against MSEL could be satisfied by the personal assets of Hill
since Hill was not a party to the action.
Court

held

that

it lacked power

R.

00111.

to enter

judgment

against

Hill personally but found that the stipulation bound Hill - On
April 2, 1991, a hearing was held on Hill's clarification motion.
The court granted Hill's motion and struck the language from its
previous order that the judgment obtained against MSEL could be
satisfied

by the personal assets of Hill.

However, the court

held that the stipulation read into the record at the January,
1991 constituted an agreement by Hill that he would be personally
liable for the MESL judgment.

R.
- v -

00210.

Objection to finding that stipulation bound Hill and request
for

trial

- On

April

4,

1991, Hill

objected

to

the

court's

finding that the stipulation read into the record at the January,
1991 hearing bound him personally and moved for a jury trial on
that issue.

R. 00249.

Order entered over Hill's objection - Notwithstanding Hill's
objection,

an

order

and

judgment

was

personally based upon the stipulation.

iii.

entered

against

Hill

R. 00271.

Statement of Relevant Facts.

Judge Brian's erroneous judgment and order is based upon his
determination that Hill bound himself to a personal judgment as a
result of the stipulation.

Relevant portions of the hearing in

which the stipulation was made are as follows:
1.

The only purpose of hearing was to reduce the amount of

the MESL judgment,.

"THE COURT:

The only purpose that the Court

is conducting an evidentiary hearing is to determine the amount
of the plaintiffs' default judgment."

January 16, 1991 Tr. , P.

4, L. 9-12.
2.

The Court's restated Lhat the purpose of the hearing was

limited
Court

to reduction of the MESL judgment.

is not going

Judge Fishier.
misunderstood

"THE COURT:

The

to go back and relitigate the decision by

The purpose of this hearing, unless the Court
the

position

of

both

counsel

in

setting

this

hearing, was to determine how much the default judgment should
- vi -

be."

All counsel agreed to the court's statement.

January 16,

1991 Tr., P. 9, L. 3-9.
3.

Mr. Hill stipulated to reduce the MESL judgment amount.

"MR. KUHNHAUSEN:
behalf of him.

I only represent Mr. Hill.

I can only speak on

He would agree that an equitable amount of the

judgment should be $15,000.
have that he wasn't

That doesn't waive any claims he may

a partner, your honor, whether or not he

received notice, and those other claims, for the record.

January

16, 1991 Tr., P. 35, L. 9-14.
4.

Counsel for Mr. Hill clarified the stipulation.

KUHNHAUSEN:

Means we are here today

"MR.

on an evidentiary hearing,

the Court would determine what the judgment would have been had
your client put on a case.
settlement
don't

know

whether

—

fair

whether

We will agree that $15,000 is a fair

figure for
my

client

the Court determined

the judgment to be entered.
will

ever

appeal

the

I

issue

of

him to be a partner, or not.

I

don't think that really an issue that has to be linked to this
judgment amount.

With that understanding, we would stipulate."

January 16, 1991 Tr., P. 35, L. 16-24.
5.

Mr. TTill preserved his appeal rights.

"MR. NTEr.SON:

think all he is saying is he reserves the right to appeal."
court

then

appeal.

agreed

that Mr. Hill was preserving

January 16, 1991 Tr., P. 35, L. 25;

- vii -

his

right

P. 36, L. 1.

I
The
to

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In 1985, Hays, plaintiffs/respondents,

initiated

an action

against MESL.
Hays alleged in their Complaint that MESL was a partnership
but made no mention of who the partners were.

A default judgment

was entered against MESL, an assumed name of Smith.

New counsel

for MESL later argued and the trial court originally held that
Hill was a partner by estoppel in MESL and that he was bound by
the judgment even though he had not been named in the lawsuit,
had not been served with summons, etc.

The parties entered into

a conditional and ambiguous tentative settlement stipulation in
open court based

upon the trial court's erroneous ruling that

Hill was bound by said judgment.
VI-VII above.)
that

Hill was

(See § iii, Para. 1-4, Page

Hill then successfully argued to the trial court
not

bound

by

the judgment

against MESL.

(See

appendix, Minute Entry, Defendant's Motion to Strike granted.)
The trial court then erroneously concluded that Hill was bound by
the stipulation and entered judgment against him for the amount
discussed

as

a possible

settlement

in the stipulation.

(See

appendix, Minute Entry, Plaintiff's Motion for Fntry of Judqment
is granted as per the stipulation reached on January 16, 1991 as
to both defendants personally.)
Appellant Hill asserts that the court had no jurisdiction to
enter

judgment against Hill, a non party

to the suit, without

amending the complaint to name Hill as a defendant and service of
- 1 -

summons or without Hill's assent to be made a party to the action
and to entry of a judgment against him.

Appellant additionally

asserts that the Court erred in summarily

(sua sponte) entering

judgment against him based upon the stipulation, the meaning of
which is in dispute.

(See § iii, Para. 1-4, Page VI-VII)

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE.

HILL IS NOT A PARTY TO THE ACTION AND THE COURT

LACKS JURISDICTION TO MAKE HILL A PARTY WITHOUT HIS CONSENT.
Hill has never been named individually as a defendant in this
lawsuit.

The default judgment obtained by Hays was against MESL.

1. Jurisdiction is a prerequisite to a valid judgment.
Fed.

Pr.

&

recognized
association

Proc,

the
can

Wright

rule

that

only

be

&

Miller

judgment
enforced

§

1105,

against
against

pages

an

4A

135-146

unincorporated

the

assets

of

the

entity, and that to enter a valid judgment against an individual
member of the association

(such as Hill), the court must first

acquire personal jurisdiction over him.
acquired

by

suing

the

partner

and

Personal jurisdiction is

serving

him

with

summons.

Because the trial court never obtained jurisdiction of Hill by
Hill's consent in the January, 1991 stipulation or otherwise, a
judgment could not have been entered against him personally.
Further, 4A Fed. Pr. & P r o c , Wright & Miller § 1688, page
467

recognized

the

rule

that

once permission

- 2 -

to add

a party

defendant

is granted, the plaintiff

is requred

to comply with

Rules 3 and 4 delaing with service of summons, etc.
2.

A court cannot, sua spontef cause a non party to become a

party.

In Monroe City v. Arnold, 452 P.2d 321, 22 U.2d 291 (Utah

1969),

the Utah Supreme Court dealt with a a similar but less

egregious

fact

situation.

In

that

defendant, who had not been served
courtroom during the trial.

case

the

sons

of

with process, were

the

in the

When evidence established that the

sons were the real parties in interest, without naming the sons
as defendants or serving them with process, the trial court made
the sons defendants and forced them to participate in the trial.
At the conclusion of the trial the court entered judgment against
the father and the sons.
sons

because

they

were

The Supreme Court reversed as to the
not

properly

before

the

court.

The

present case is much stronger since Hill had no notice of the
lawsuit or had an opportunity to appear and participate at the
time the default judgment was entered.
Similarly, the court in Spudnuts, Inc. v. Lane, 676 P.2d 669
(Ariz.

App.

violation

1984),

to add

concluded

a party

that

there

was

a

due

defendant who was not served

process
in the

action and who had no chance to answer and defendant.
3.

Hill never consented to be a party to this action or to

have judgment entered against him personally - The record is void
of any written or oral consent of Hill to be made a party to this
action.

Hill is and has been at all times, a non party to the
- 3 -

action.

Hill's only involvement is a questionable finding by the

trial court that he was a partner by estoppel to the defendant.
While that finding might support a lawsuit against Hill no such
lawsuit was filed.

Hill has never consented to having a judgment

against him personally.

The only inference of a possible consent

was in the stipulation referred to in the statement of relevant
facts.

(Page VI-VII above.)

Yet in that stipulation Hill merely

agreed that the amount of the MESL judgment should be reduced.
Hill

expressly

personally
etc.

reserved

liable for

the

right

to

contest

whether

he

was

the MESL judgment, his right to appeal,

The stipulation is anything but an unconditional agreement

by Hill to pay the reduced amount of the MESL judgment to settle
the lawsuit as concluded

by the trial court.

The trial court

committed manifest error when it entered judgment against Hill
personally for the amount of the MESL judgment.

POINT TWO.
WHICH

THE

BECAUSE THERE

JUDGMENT

IS

IS A DISPUTE TO THE FACTS UPON

BASED,

JUDGMENT

SHOULD

NOT

HAVE

BEEN

ENTERED WITHOUT A TRIAL ON THE ISSUE.
Without a trial or evidentiary hearing th<* trial court held
that pursuant to the stipulation read in open court In January,
1991,

Hill

became

personally

liable

for

the

MESL

judgment.

Thereafter the trial court issued an order and a judgment against
Hill.
amounted

The
to

question
a

of

consent

whether
by

Hill
- 4 -

the
to

terms
be

of

the

personally

stipulation
bound

is a

disputed question of fact.

The trial court could determine that

disputed question of fact without a trial.

Courts are empowered

to determine the law but facts are to be decided by the jury when
a jury demand has been made.

In this case, once the trial court

determined that there was a disputed

issue of whether Hill had

consented to be personally bound, he erred by entering judgment
against Hill without a trial and by not granting Hill's demand
for

a

jury

trial

on

the

disputed

issue

of

whether

he

had

consented to become personally liable for the judgment.
UCA 78-21-1 provides that issues of fact may be tried by a
jury unless a jury is waived.
the contrary, he demanded
trial court determined

Hill did not waive a jury, but to

a jury trial upon learning that the

that there was an issue of fact as to

whether he had been personally bound by the stipulation.
Appendix,

Hill's

Plaintiffs'

Memorandum

Proposed

Order

in
and

Support
Judgment,

of

(See

Objection

Motion

to

to

Amend

Judgment, Motion for a Trial or New Trial and Demand for Jury
Trial).

See also, UCA 78-21-2 which mandates that in all cases

where the trial

is be by jury, all evidence thereon

is to be

addrossed to them, not the judge.
The

trial

court's

sua

sponte

determination

that

the

stipulation bound Hill deprived him of his property without due
process.

See Utah Const. Art. I, § 7;

the U.S. Constitution.

- 5 -

5th & 14th Amendments to

Art. I, § 11 of the Utah Constitution provides in part that
"no person shall be barred from defending before any tribunal in
this state,

, any civil cause to which he is a party."

URCP 3, 5, 8, et seq. state the procedure for commencement of a
civil action, URCP 4 provides for service of summons, etc.

Hill

has not waived his right to litigate the disputed issues in the
usual manner, including

the dispute

as to the meaning

of the

stipulation and whether under the stipulation he was somehow made
a party to the lawsuit and somehow allegedly consented that the
judgment be against him individually.
URCP 56 allows the Court to grant summary judgment only when
there are no disputed material facts.

The facts referred to the

appellant's statement of facts clearly demonstrate that there are
disputed issues of fact which if resolved in favor of Hill would
entitle him to avoid personal liability.
rejection of Hill's defenses and

Accordingly, the Court'

(in effect) summary judgment,

were improper and should be vacated and set aside and Hill should
be given a trial on said issues.
CONCLUSION
The

trial

court

erred

in

ontering

judgment

against

Hill

individually as he was not a party to the action, never gave his
consent

to be a party, or to otherwise

have

judgment

entered

against him.
The

Court

erred

in ordering

that

the amended

judgment be

entered against Hill individually based upon a stipulation read
- 6 -

in

open

court

because

determination

of

the

meaning

of

the

stipulation was of a disputed fact to which Hill is entitled to a
trial before a jury or at a minimum a trial before the court.
Accordingly, that order should be vacated and the issue should be
determined by a trial of that dispute in this case or in a new
lawsuit.
Respectfully submitted this

f£)

day of July, 1992.

^Ronald C. Barker,
David C. Cundick
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
'
day of July, 1992, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed,
postage prepaid to:
Francis J. Nielson
ARNOVITZ, SMITH & NIELSON
Attorney for Respondent
310 South Main, #1305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
I also certify that I lodged an unbound draft of this brief
by mail on the IO
day of July, 1992.

Ronald C. Barker

- 7 -

APPENDIX

Third JL.'J>:.;,-;! uh\

NOV 1 3 1991
f\

SALT LAK£

cpu\J\i

Francis J. Nielson, 2411
ARNOYTIZ, SMITH & NIELSCN
Attorney for Plaintiffs
310 South Main Street, Suite 1305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-0524
3S803
IN THE DISTRICT (XDRT OF THE THUS) JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND K H SALT LAKE CDENIY, STEATE OF UTAH
"•" • — o o O o o -

ORDER

S m E N HAYS and FRED O. HAYS,
iMfjiinrl i I I s ,

vs

MINEAIN BQUIIMENT SALES
AND LEAS D C (XMPANY,

n9008?QCV

Defendant.
- -00O00- •

The plaintiffs, Steven Hays nnd Tired n, Hays (Hays) obtained a
Judgment against Mountain Equipment Sales And Leasing Canpany ONES'
conmenced
Kerry

(Snith) and William E. Hill (Hill)

partners doing business as MESL.

1988, against
-

alleged

Shiith and Hill den

MESI , - ij i :!! 1 i 1< :d a I I; > ti : n , :! oi Relief F I cm Judgment

-

Plaintiff

served Snith and Hill with an Order to Show Cause seeking a determination that
they were partners doing business ««>•• M::si

Tim n m H i-i^ie^n le<i HI V\ identiary

determine whether Snith and Hill were partners in
MESL.

The Cou

iadt atai ui ttnu

*

its Memorandum Decision on October 29, 1990, ruling
'

f ricr <• i MESL,

evidentiary

hearing to determine the amount of plaintiffs1 Judgement on January 16, 1991.
The Court heard testimony of the parties.
Court gave the parties an opportunity
entered

Before ruling on the matter, the

to discuss settlement.

into extensive settlement negotiations.

Hill, entered

into a Stipulation

The parties

The plaintiffs, Smith, and

for Settlement

in which they agreed that

Judgment would be entered against them personally in the principal amount of
$15,000.00, plus

interest

at

the rate of

ten percent

(10%) per annum for

fifty-three (53) months, in the amount of $6,625.00, for a total Judgment of
$21,625.00.
Judgment

The

plaintiffs

to determine

agreed

to wait

ten

(10) days

to enforce

if the parties could agree on a payment plan.

the
The

parties further agreed that if they could not agree upon a payment plan within
the ten (10) day period, plaintiffs may proceed with post-Judgment remedies to
collect the Judgment.

The Settlement Agreement was read into the record.

Court asked Smith and Hill
therein.

The

if they understood the agreement, and acquiesced

Smith and Hill replied

in the affirmative.

The Court

instructed

plaintiffs' counsel to prepare a Settlement Stipulation, Order and Judgment.
The documents were prepared and submitted to Hill's attorney and Smith, all of
wham declined to execute the documents.

Hill

retained Ronald C. Barker who

filed Hill's Objection to plaintiffs' proposed Order and Judgment, a Motion to
Amend the Judgment, a Motion for a Trial or New Trial, and Demand for Jury.
Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Judgment and Hill's Motions vrere heard on April 2,
1991.

Having heard

argument

of

counsel, and

having

heretofore

entered

Memorandun Decision, and being fully advised in the premises, it is
ORDERED:

-9-

n/io^/^

a

Mbtior

Strike

t
against

flu Ins(

(Mnber

defendant

William

evidentiary h e a r i n g

E

Hill's

spn!piu>*

nil1 (fir i null's

.'H, Will, "Plaintiff may proceed

assets

at the conclusion

oi

the

sranted.
Motions to Amend Judgment, *-- • ~ ">*

N e w Trial,

and Demand for Jury are denied.
3,

I" I in i in I I 1 s"" I'Vl 11 11 J

1

I ,ii 11 i .1 udgment

aga inst

defendants

Snith and Hill personally pursuant to (he Settlement Stipulation agreed t
open court on January

$15,000.0

I 4 III l 'rM'

I l y If)i

Hill

$6,625.00,

I l IIY I

| M II

>tal Judgment of $21,625.00, is granted.
Findings of
sentenc

, *eferenc*

* •

said Order are hereby adopted and incorporated herein
J^

Exhibit A )
MTBD if' ; _ /Jj, day

, * $ K J T 1991.
BY TOE COURT:

SE^~

P A T B . BRIAN
Thi rd Di st r ict i Xw\x i .I udge

-3-

4

NOV t • «
Francis J. Nielson, 2411
ARN3VITZ, SMITH & NIEL9CN
Attorney for Plaintiffs
310 South Main Street, Suite 1305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-0524
39803
IN THE DISTRICT CCQRT Of THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISflRlCT
IN AND FCR SALT L4KE OGCNIY, SIATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—

STEVEN HAYS and FRED O. HAYS,

JUDOUBTT

Plaintiffs,

11-15-^1 S-C^oivw.

vs.
MXNIAIN EQUIRvENT SALES
AND LEASING OOvPANY,

Civil N o . 850900810CV

Defendant.

Judge Pat B . Brian
—ooOoo

rhilL 'HUM"1 1'Hiii,1 «i'i i" <•• hearing 'before the Honorable Pat B. Brian,
Judgr -*
appearet

above-entitled Court, on January
person

16, 1991.

The plaintiffs

through their attorney of record, Franc

The

I appeared in person and through his. attorney of

record, Steven Kuhnhausen. Kerry G, Staith appeared in person and representing
himself.

The plaintiffs, Steven Hays and H-- 1 ^
Smith, entered

iii..;,

Flll

f|,,, ,[, f, M ] H I , ,^

Settlement Agreement mi

which William E . Hill and Kerry G. Staith agreed tllat Judgment may be entered
against them personalis
of ten percent (10%) per annim
$6,625.00,

_ „ „ Judgmen*

, j: ..Ins li ite res 1 at the rate
fifty-three (53) months in the an i unt of
*„ u,i anx>unt ol $'21,625.00.

Plaii :ni iffs!

/ H I' > 9 ^

counsel, Francis J. Nielson, read this Settlement Agreement into the record.
The defendants William E. Hill and Kerry G. Snith stated to the Cburt that
they understood and agreed to the Settlement Agreement, and having agreed that
Judgment

may

be

entered

against

them

in

favor

of

plaintiffs,

and

the

plaintiffs, being also present in Court, having acquiesced in the Settlement
Agreement, and good cause appearing,
IT IS OEDERED, ADJUDC2D, AND DECREED that plaintiffs Steven Hays
and Fred 0. Hays have and recover from defendants William E. Hill and Kerry G.
Snith, the sun of $15,000.00, interest thereon at the rate of ten percent
(10%) per

annum

for

fifty-three

(53) months, which

interest

arrounts

to

$6,625.00, for a total Judgment of $21,623^6.
DATED this / g

day of \MjK\,
/

1991.

BY THE CXXRT:

^^

(Z^</ls^^

PAT B. BRIAN
Third District Court Judge
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ISSUES AN 11 TRJAI
Rescission of instruments.
In action to rescind instruments by which a
defendant purports to have obtained title to the
property of a plaintiff's ward, the fact that one
document is the ward*6 will does not transfer it
into a will contest, and the court may refuse
the request for a jurv trial. Johnson v. Johnson, 9 I Jtah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959).
Right to jury trial.
Right to have a jury pass upon issues of fact
does not include right to have a cause submitted to the jury in hope of 8 verdict where the
facts undisputably show that the plaintiff is
not entitled to relief. Raymond v. Union Pac.
R.R., 113 Utah 26, 191 P.2d 137 (1948).
Defendant was entitled to a jury trial on the
issue of damages, upon his demand, notwithstanding that the paramount object of the
plaintiff's action was to secure an injunction
and that the claim for damages was but incidental to the injunctive relief sought. Valley
Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 119 Utah 204, 225
P.2d 739 (1951).
Where there is substantial contradictory evidence on both sides, the case must be given to
the jury- Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204,
240 P.2d 491 (1952)

Upon a subsequent trial of the same cause o'
action, a plaintiff seeking damages is bound by
his testimony concerning material and observable facts given at the first trial which resulted
in a nonsuit on the ground of contributory negligence, and cannot materially change such
testimony in order to offset the defense of con*
tributary negligence Therefore, the trial court
does not err in refusing to submit the issue to
the jury, and in granting the defendant's motion for a dismissal. Tebbs v. Peterson 122
Utah 214, 247 P.2d 897 (1952)
Specific performance action.
Granting a jury trial in an action for specific
performance of contract for the sale of land is
not error where issues agreed upon at pretrial
involved more than a mere reading and interpretation of the alleged lease and option; there
were issues as to whether the husband could,
as a sole signatory, bind his nonsigning wife,
whether a memorandum was sufficiently unclear as to justify the introduction of evidence
to clarify it and issues as to intentions of the
parties in executing the agreement. Corbet v.
Cox, 30 Utah 2d 361, 517 P„2d 1318 11974!.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Right to Civil Jury
Trial in Utah: Constitution and Statute, 8
Utah L. Rev. 97.
Am. JUT. 2d. — 47 Am Jur. 2d Jurv §§ 39,
42, 45.
C.J.S. — 50 CJ.S. Juries §§ 16 to 17, 22.
A.L.R. — Right in equity suit to jury trial of
counterclaim involving legal issue, 17
A.L.R.3d 1321.
Statute reducing number of jurors as violative of right to jury trial, 47 A.L.R.3d 895.
Right to jury trial on motion to vacate judgment, 75 A.L.R.3d 894.

Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51
A.L.R.4th 565.
Right to jury trial in state court divorce pro
ceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955.
Small claims: jury trial rights in, and on appeal from, small claims court proceeding. 70
A.L.R.4th 1119.
Propriety of substituting juror in bifurcated
state trial after end of first phase and before
second phase is given to jury, 89 A.L.R.4th 423.
Key Numbers. — Jury «» 9 to 10V2, 14(2).

78-21-2. Jury to decide questions of fact.
All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury, other than those mentioned
in the next section [Section 78-21-3], are to be decided by the jury, and all
evidence thereon is to be addressed to them, except when otherwise provided.
History: JL 1951, < b SH I"!
' MM I
Court to charge that the jury are the excluSupp., 104-21-2.
sive judges of all questions of fact, Rules of
Cross-References. — Contents of writings, Civil Procedure, Rule 51.
recordings and photographs, determinations
Trial by jury or court, Rules of Civil Procefor jury, Rules of Evidence, Rule 1008.
dure, Rules 39(a) to (c).
Court submission of special findings to jury,
Verdict may be general or" special. Rules of
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49(a).
Civil Procedure, Rules 49(a), (b), 58A(a).
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HISTORY AND PURPOSE

Ch. 5

Rule 21

just.6 The court should be particularly willing to exercise its
power to order a party brought into the action if the absentee's
presence is required under Rule 17(a) or Rule 19.7 As discussed in
an earlier section,8 the court has the power to drop a party when it
is necessary to preserve its diversity jurisdiction over the case.
§ 1688.
Motion to Add or Drop a Party
Whether the motion pursuant to Rule 21 is to add or to drop a
party, it must be made in the usual manner and with notice to the
other parties. Notice need not be given to those whose joinder is
sought, however.1 This result is proper since the rules do not
plaintiff, even though no motion for
the addition of the party has been
made. Paper Container Mfg Co. v.
Dixie Cup Co., D.C.Del.1947, 74
F.Supp. 389, reversed on other
grounds C.A.3d, 1948, 170 F.2d 333
(dictum), certiorari denied 69 S.Ct.
515, 336 U.S. 909, 93 L.Ed. 1074.

Rekeweg v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co.,
D.C.Ind.1961, 27 F.R.D. 431.
Delia Plastering Co. v. D. H. Dave, Inc.,
D.C.Ohio 1951, 11 F.R.D. 304.
Uarte v. U.S., D.C.Cal.1948, 7 F.R.D.
705.
Society of European Stage Authors &
Composers v. WCAU Broadcasting
Co., D.C.Pa.1940, 1 F.R.D. 264.

8. Preserve diversity jurisdiction
See § 1685.

But compare
In Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc.,
D.C.Del.1960, 187 F.Supp. 179, affirmed C.A.3d, 1963, 313 F.2d 472,
certiorari denied 83 S.Ct. 1693, 1695,
374 U.S. 806, 10 L.Ed.2d 1031, the
court held that if a party is properly
joined under Rules 19 and 20, then
Rule 21 does not authorize the court
to drop that party on its own motion
because he destroys diversity. Rule
21 is concerned only with the nonjoinder and misjoinder of parties, not
with the question whether jurisdiction is proper.
6. Court may impose terms
The district court may drop or add parties on its own initiative at any stage
of the action on such terms as are
just. Savoia Film S.A.I, v. Vanguard
Films, Inc., D.C.N.Y.1950, 10 F.R.D.
64.
7. Absentee required
A district court, in furtherance of justice and on its own initiative may,
and in a proper case should, order the
addition of an indispensable party

1. Notice unnecessary

'

Hoffman for & on behalf of NLRB v.
Beer Drivers & Salemen's Local
Union No. 888, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers of America, C.A.9th, 1976,
536 F.2d 1268.
When following the motion to dismiss,
on the ground that the original plaintiff lacked the capacity to bring a
wrongful death action, plaintiff
amended the complaint so as, inter
alia, to substitute the alleged next of
kin as voluntary plaintiffs no service
of process was required on defendant.
Roberts v. Husky Indus., Inc., D.C.
Tenn.1973, 71 F.R.D. 479, 480, citing
Wright & Miller.
U.S. v. Bayer Co., D.C.N.Y.1952, 105
F.Supp. 955.
Reiling v. Bhattacharyya, N.D.1978, 270
N.W.2d 562, 564, citing Wright *
Miller.
Pask v. Corbitt, 1975, 220 S.E.2d 378,
381, 28 N.C.App. 100, citing Wright
A Miller.
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§

1688
Rule 21

expressly provide for notice in this situation; for example, Rule
5(a) does not require that notice be given to the absentee. Moreover, an analogy may be drawn to Rule 14(a), which only requires
notice to the parties of a motion to bring in a third-party defendant.
A defect in parties must be specifically raised and should not
be argued indirectly through a motion for summary judgment
under Rule 56.a If permission to add a party defendant is granted,
plaintiff must comply with the requirements of Rules 3 and 4
relating to the issuance of a summons and service on the added
party.8 Typically, upDn the granting of a motion to add a plaintiff
all proceedings are stayed until the new plaintiff enters an appearance.4 It is not necessary, however, that the parties to be added
under this rule submit their proposed pleading on the motion,5 as
is required of intervenors under Rule 24.8
Rule 21 specifically permits a change in parties "at any stage
in the action." 7 However, the court typically will deny a request
Compare
When a proposed settlement of actions
brought as class actions against thirteen defendants for an alleged conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws
involved only three defendants, the
proposed settlements were an attempt to compromise the claims of
the class that had not been determined, and therefore Rule 23(e), pertaining to giving notice of settlement
to all members of the class was applicable and not superseded by the passage in Rule 21 permitting parties to
be dropped at any stage of the action.
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda
Am. Brass Co., D.C.Pa 1967, 42 F.R.D.
324. See vol. 7B, § 1797.
2. Motion to be specific
Ziegler v. Akin, C.A.lOth, 1958, 261
F.2d 88.
Aleut Corp. v. Rogers, Alaska 1980, 619
P.2d 472, 473, citing Wright & Miller.
3. Comply with Rules 3 and 4
Same v. Fiesta Motel, DC.Pa.1978, 79
F.R.D. 567, 570, citing Wright &
Miller.

Stanley Works v Haeger Potteries, Inc.,
D.C.I11.1964, 35 F.R.D. 551, 554.
Blum v. Postal Tel., Inc., D.C.Pa.1945,
60 F.Supp. 237.
See also
Spudnuts, Inc. v Lane, App.1984, 676
P.2d 669, 670, 139 Ariz. 35, citing
Wright & Miller.
4. Proceedings stayed
Askey v. C. & M. Service, D.C.Pa.1968,
45 F.R.D. 242.
5. Proposed pleadings unnecessary
Fuller v American Mach. & Foundry
Co., D.C.N.Y.1951, 95 F.Supp. 764.
6. Intervention practice
See vol. 7C, § 1914.
7. Motion at any stage
When defendant's trial counsel who had
resisted joining the corporation as a
party to the breach of contract action
abruptly withdrew from the practice
of law after the trial and defendant
was required to retain a new attorney
who promptly moved to join the corporation as a plaintiff-counterdefendant prior to the entry of judgment the interests of justice and
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Cite as 676 V2d 669 (Arir.App. 1984)

SPUDNUTS, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
John LANE, dba Spudnuts Franchise,
Defendant/Appellant.
No. 2 CA-CIV 4735.
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2.
Feb. 6, 1984.

After original judgment for plaintiff in
breach of contract action was affirmed on
appeal, plaintiff moved to add wife of defendant as an additional party defendant.
The Superior Court, Gila County, Cause
No. CV 20,853, Edward L. Dawson, J.,
granted the motion, and defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Birdsall, C.J.,
held that where no attempt was ever made
to serve wife and wife's liability was not
adjudicated by trial court, she could not be
subjected to liability by her addition as a
party defendant after case had been decided on appeal.
Judgment vacated.

1. Parties <8=>52
Rule authorizing dropping or adding of
parties by order of court at any stage of
the action on such terms as are just does
not allow postjudgment addition of party
defendants. 16 A.R.S. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 21.
2. Husband and Wife <3=>224
Service of process on husband was not
sufficient to permit obtaining ,of a personal
judgment against his wife or the community.
3. Husband and Wife e=>270(10)
A judgment against one spouse does
not bind the community. A.R.S. § 25-215,
subd. D.

4. Process <S=J48
Where service of process does not comply with statutory requirements, court does
not obtain jurisdiction over the person.
5. Parties <S=»52
Where no attempt was ever made to
serve defendant's wife and wife's liability
was not adjudicated by the trial court, she
could not be subjected to liability by her
addition as a party defendant after case
had been decided on appeal. 16 A.R.S.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 21.
Cavness & DeRose by Jerry DeRose,
Globe, for plaintiff/appellee.
Patten, Montague & Arnett by Wayne C.
Arnett, Tempe, for defendant/appellant.
OPINION
BIRDSALL, Chief Judge.
This appeal arises from the amendment
of a judgment to add a party-defendant
after the original judgment was affirmed
on appeal.
The applicable facts are as follows. The
original action was filed July 28, 1978, in
Gila County Superior Court. The complaint alleged a breach of a franchise
agreement between appellee Spudnuts, Inc.
and the appellant, John t&ne. The cause
was submitted to the court on the record
and judgment was entered April 23, 1981,
against appellant. He appealed and we
affirmed in Spudnuts, Inc. v. Lane, 131
Ariz. 424, 641 P.2d 912 (App.1982). While
the appeal was pending, appellee moved the
trial court to amend the pleadings to add
Gail Lane* wife of the appellant, as an
additional party-defendant. The court denied the motion because jurisdiction had
been removed to this court. However, after the mandate of this court issued on
March 18, 1982, appellee again moved the
superior court to amend the pleadings to
add Gail Lane. On October 29, 1982, the
court filed an amended judgment, subjecting the new party-defendant to liability,
and it is from this amended judgment that
appellant has brought this appeal.
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flj Appellee's motions to amend were
based on Rules 15(b) and 21 Arizona Rules
of Civil Procedure, 16 A R S Rule 15(b),
however, allows amendments to conform to
the evidence and does not apply here where
the addition of a party defendant is sought
Rule 21 does cover this situation
It
states
"Misjoinder of parties is net grounds
for dismissal of an action Pirties may
be dropped or added by order of the
court on motion of any party or of its
own initiative at any stage of the action
and on such terms as are just Any
claim against a party may be severed and
proceeded with separately "
Appellee argues that since the rules are to
be construed liberally and in a reasonable
manner, Union Interchange, lnc v Ben
ton, 100 Ariz 33, 410 P 2d 477 (1966), and
technicalities are not to govern, Dons Club
v Anderson, 83 Ariz 94, 317 P 2d 534
(1957), the failure to include Gail Lane as a
defendant was technical in nature and her
addition, even after judgment and resolu
tion on appeal, should be allowed Appel
lee cites Benson v Hunter, 23 Ariz 132,
202 P 233 (1921), which arose m a vastly
different factual situation There, the An
zona Supreme Court held that the dece
dent's husband should have been joined in
the complaint since it was not clear wheth
er the complaint was referring to the dece
dents separate property or to the marital
community The court found that the trial
court should have required the plaintiff to
amend his complaint by joining the dece
dent's husband with her in the case or
dismiss the case for defects m naming the
parties Our case is not capable of remand
to the tnar court to have appellant's wife
added and have the case proceed from the
beginning Rather, we are faced with de
cidmg whether Rule 21 allows postjudg
ment addition of party defendants It does
not
In Moore v Knowles, 482 F 2d 1069 (5th
Cirl973), the court found that Rule 21
provided wide discretion for the joinder of
parties but joinder must be accomplished
within the requirements of due process In
that case, the court found that while the

trial court was correct in deciding whether
judgment should be entered against a
school board rather than just the individual
members, its notification and joining the
board in the final judgment was not suffi
cient to obtain jurisdiction over the board
However, the court was able to remand the
case to the district court to allow the plain
tiff to join the board as a corporate body
[2,3] In the instant case, where no re
mand is possible, and the case not only has
been brought to judgment but has been
laid to rest on appeal, we are faced with a
due process violation by the addition of a
party defendant who was not served in the
action and who had no chance to answer
and defend Service of process on appel
lant is not sufficient to permit the obtain
mg of a personal judgment against his wife
or the community A R S § 25-215(D) pro
vides that if a plaintiff wants to hold a
marital community accountable for an obh
gation, both spouses must be sued jointly
A judgment against one spouse does not
bind the community Eng v Stein, 123
Ariz 343, 599 P 2d 796 (1979)
Helpful language is found in Same v
Fiesta Motel, 79 F R D 567 (E D Pa 1978)
The court stated
"
only Fiesta was before the court
when trial started Although under the
provisions of Federal R Civ P 21, parties
may be added by order of court on mo
tion or on its own initiative at any stage
of the action, the terms of jpinder must
be just The parties to be added must be
properly brought before the court or no
judgment can be entered or enforced
The requirements of due process must be
met Moore v Knowles, 482 F 2d 1069
1075 (5th Cir 1973) If permission to add
a party defendant is granted plaintiff
must comply W l t n the provisions of Rule
3 and 4 relating to the issuance of sum
mons and service C Wright and A
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1688 It is true that Arsenis has been
present in the court room during the
entire trial and had appeared as a wit
ness His presence and testimony, how
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ever, did not amount to a submission to
the jurisdiction of the court, [citations
omitted]" 79 F.R.D. at 570.
[4,5] It is fundamental where service
of process does not comply with the statutory requirements, the court does not obtain jurisdiction over the person. Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co,
339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865
(1950); Smith v. Smith, 117 Ariz. 249, 571
P.2d 1045 (App.1977). No attempt was
ever made to serve Gail Lane in this case.
Gail Lane's liability was not adjudicated by
the trial court and she cannot be subjected
to liability by her addition as a party-defendant after the case has been decided on
appeal. Rule 21 only allows such an addi-

tion of a party on such terms as are "just"
and we cannot ascertain how the procedure
utilized in this case could ever be construed
as just.
The amended judgment entered on October 29, 1982, is vacated.
HATHAWAY and HOWARD, JJ., concur.
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Ronald C. Barker #0208
Attorney for William E. Hill
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Telephone (801) 486-9636
FAX (801) 486-5754
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
ooOoo—•" '-^^ --^^.-. ~J* „..
STEVEN HAYS and FRED HAYS,

) HILL'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS'
) PROPOSED ORDER AND JUDGMENT,
MOTION TO AMEND JDDGMENT,
) MOTION FOR A TRIAL OR NEW TRIAL
and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
)
Civil No. 850900810 CV

Plaintiffs,
VS.
MOUNTAIN EQUIPMENT SALES
AND LEASING COMPANY,

)

Defendant.

Judge Pat B. Brian
)

ooOoo
William
Ronald

E.

C.

memorandum

Hill's

Barker
of

("HILL"),

("BARKER"),

authorities

by

and

hereby

in

support

through
submits

of

his

his
the

attorney
following

objections

and

motions.
I

Hill's objections and motions
1.

Hill's

objections

and

motions

-

Hill

has

filed

an

OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED ORDER AND JUDGMENT, a MOTION TO
AMEND JDDGMENT, a MOTION FOR A TRIAL, and/or a motion for a NEW
TRIAL and has made a DEMAND FOR JORY TRIAL of said issues.
other

things

said

order

amending

objection

said

and motions

judgment

and

order

ask
so

the Court
as

to

not

Among
for an
award

judgment against Hill individually and/or for a jury trial and/or
- 1 -

00251

new trial by jury on all issues, including but not limited to the
disputed issues as to whether the 1/16/91 stipulation constituted
an

agreement

by

Hill

that

he

be

individually

joined

as a

defendant in this lawsuit and that judgment be entered against
him individually.

Said motions are supported by the affidavit of

Hill filed herewith and by the prior motions and memorandums
filed herein by Barker on behalf of Hill.
_II
Court's jurisdiction to grant relief
2.

Authority to object - Hill is authorized by RJS 4-504(2)

to object to a proposed order as stated in 11 1 of Hill's motions.
3.

Authority for motions - The motions in 1[ 2 of Hill's

motion for a jury trial and/or a new trial by jury on all issues,
including

but not limited

to whether the 1/16/91 stipulation

constituted an agreement by Hill that he be individually joined
as a defendant

in this lawsuit and that judgment be entered

against him individually are authorized by and are made pursuant
to the provisions of URCP 59(a)(1) [irregularity in proceedings
of the court and/or abuse of discretion], 59(a)(6) [insufficiency
of evidence to justify decision & fact that it is against law] ,
59(a)(7)

[error

in

law], 60(b)(1)

[mistake, etc.],

60(b)(4)

[summons not served on Hill, etc.], 60(b)(5) [judgment is void],
60(b)(7) and other applicable statutes, rules and laws.

- 2 -
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Ill
ARGUMENT
4.

Due process - Hill is entitled to not be deprived of his

property without due process.

See Utah Const. Art. I, § 7;

5th

& 14th amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
5.

Right to trial - Art. I, S 11 of the Utah Constitution

provides in part that "no person shall be barred from defending
before any tribunal in this state, . . . , any civil cause to
which he is a party.

URCP 3, 5, 8f et seq. state the procedure

for commencement of a civil action, URCP 4 provides for service
of summons, etc.

Hill has not waived his right to litigate the

disputed issues in the usual manner, including the dispute as to
the meaning of the stipulation and whether under the stipulation
he was somehow made a party to the lawsuit and somehow allegedly
consented that the judgment be against him individually.

Hill is

entitled to be served with summons and complaint, to file an
answer,

cross-claim

against

Smith, to

conduct

discovery, to

attend a pre-trial and to have a trial by jury.
that right is to deny him his due process rights.

To deny Hill
See Hill's

2/21/91 memorandum herein, including but not limited to 1[ 22, 23
and 24 thereof.
6.

Right to jury trial - Under 78-21—1, UCA, 1953, Hill is

entitled to trial by jury with respect to said disputed issues.
The Court's summary disposition of Hill's defenses at the 4/2/91
hearing denied Hill his right to a jury trial.
39(a), et seq.

See URCP 38(a),

Hill has made a demand for a jury trial.
- 3 illlO-O

7.

Summary judgment improper because of disputed facts -

URCP 56 allows the Court to grant summary judgment only when
there are no disputed material facts.
affidavit

filed

herewith

clearly

The foregoing and Hill's

demonstrate

that

there

are

disputed issues of fact which if resolved in favor of Hill would
entitle him to avoid personal liability.

Accordingly, the Court1

rejection of Hill's defenses and (in effect) summary judgmentf
were improper/ should be vacated and set aside and Hill should be
given a trial on said issues.
8.

Incorporation by reference - Hill incorporates herein by

reference thereto the allegations and arguments in his verified
motions and memorandums filed herein dated about 2/21/91 and the
content of his affidavit filed herewith.
IV
Conclusion
The Court erred

in ordering that the amended judgment be

entered against Hill individually without affording Hill is due
process

and

other

rights

under

the

federal

and

Utah

constitutions/ statutes, rules, etc., including his right to be
served with summons, to have a complaint stating the particulars
of the claims, to discovery, to trial by jury, etc. before he is
deprived

of his property.

Accordingly, that order should be

vacated and the remaining issues should be determined by a trial
in this case or in as a new lawsuit.

- 4 -
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Dated the

.1*

day of ApriK) 1991.

c

Ronald C. Barker
Attorney for Hill
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to be
mailed, postage prepaid/ on the y ^
day of April, 1991, to the
following persons at the addresses indicated:
Francis J. Nielson, Esq., ARNOVITZ, SMITH & NIELSON, 310 South
Main #1305, Salt Lake City, Utah 8'
Ronald C. Barker
Attorney for Hill

i.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
HAYS, STEVEN
PLAINTIFF
VS
MOUNTAIN EQUIPMENT SALES & LE
DEFENDANT

CASE NUMBER 850900810 CV
DATE 04/02/91
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN
COURT REPORTER HAL WALTON
COURT CLERK AAB

TYPE OF HEARING:
HEARING
PRESENT: DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. NIELSON, FRANCIS J,
D. ATTY. BARKER, RONALD C.

THIS MATTER COMES NOW BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING, APPEARANCES
AS SHOWN ABOVE. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE LAST SETENCE IN
THE COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION OF OCTOBER 29, 1990 AS READ INTO
THE RECORD IS GRANTED. THE COURT MAKES FINDINGS, AND RULES AS
FOLLOWS:
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IS GRANTED AS PER
THE STIPULATION REACHED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 AS TO BOTH
DEFENDANTS PERSONALLY.
COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF WILL PREPARE THE FINDINGS BY APRIL 8,
1991.
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

THE COURT:

Steven Hays and Fred Hays vs. Mountain

3

Equipment Sales and Leasing, C85-810.

4

appearance.

5

MR. NIELSON:

6

MR. KUHNHAUSEN:

7

Francis Nielson for the plaintiffs.
Steve Kuhnhausen for the defendant

Ed Hill.

8
9

Counsel will state an

THE COURT:

The matter before the Court today is an

evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of plaintiffs'

10

default judgment; is that correct?

11

MR. KUHNHAUSEN:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. NIELSON:

Yes, your Honor.

You may proceed.
If I may make a brief statement.

The

14

judgment in this case was entered on July 31 of 1986 for the

15

amount of $37,482.34 and costs of $63.50, some almost five

16

years ago.

17

there was a counterclaim involved, the defendants filed an

18

answer, were represented by counsel.

19

the defendant withdrew, filed a notice to appoint counsel or

20

appear in person, and they failed to do so.

21

scheduled a pretrial conference.

22

show up at the pretrial conference.

23

In that action the defendant was properly served,

One of the counsel for

Judge Fishier

The defendants failed to

So the question at that time was, what was the

24

amount of the judgment to be entered, the amount of the

25

default judgment?

The file will reflect that the plaintiff

1

filed an affidavit in support of the amount and the default

2

judgment, and that's on file.

3

Hays.

4

had before him at that time evidence as to the amount to be

5

entered in the default judgment.

6

judgment is almost five years old, and plaintiffs would

7

respectfully argue that the merits of this case have already

8

been decided by Judge Fishier.

9

THE COURT:

It is an affidavit of Fred

That outlines the amount of damages.

So Judge Fishier

So at this stage, this

The only purpose that the Court is

10

conducting an evidentiary hearing is to determine the amount

11

of the plaintiffs' default judgment.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

MR. NIELSON:

May I inquire, does that require us to

put on evidence as to how we arrived at the figure?
THE COURT:

Do you have a document that you would

like to mark: and submit?
MR. NIELSON:

I have the default judgment, and, of

course, the original is in the file, signed by Judge Fishier.
THE COURT:

You may obtain that, and have them

marked as exhibits.

20

(An off-the-record discussion was held.)

21

MR. KUHNHAUSEN:

I would stipulate that we have

22

copies here that would reflect those two documents.

23

no reason to pull them out.

24
25

MR. NIELSON:

There is

There is the minute entry that

reflects Judge Fishler's ruling at the pretrial conference.

1

There is the affidavit of the plaintiff in support of the

2

judgment.

3

MR. KUHNHAUSEN:

I have a copy of that affidavit /

4

Judge, if you want me to have that marked.

5

marked as Def endant's Exhi bit B

6

MR. NIELSON:

It was already

A letter to Judge Fishier by

7

plaintiff sf f ormer counsel , which is relevant.

8

the judgment of the Court, signed by Judge Fishier.

9

would be the documents on which I am relying.
THE COURT:

11

MR. KUHNHAUSEN:

No -- well, not that they are the

12

documents from the court f ile.

13

THE COURT:
those documents.

15

the Court * pi ease.

16

statement ?

17

Those

Are those documents in dispute?

10

14

Then there is

The Court will take judicial notice of

They are> in the file.

Provide the file to

Anythi ng further on your opening

MR. NIELSON:

PI aintiffs would argue that this - -

18

that the documents that I referred to in the file have

19

resolved the amount of the» judgment, and that, in effect, this

20

matter is res judicata, having already been decided over f ive

21

years ago by Judge Fishier.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. KUHNHAUSEN:

Thank you.

You may make an opening statement.
As the Court notes from the fil e,

24

you determined Mr. Smith and Mr. Hill were partners in

25

Mountain States Equipment Sales and Leasing, and you have set

5

this hearing for an evidentiary hearing to determine the
amount of the damages of the plaintiff.

I think that's

appropriate for the Court to do, in that whenever there is a
default judgement entered merely on an affidavit, I think it is
fair for the Court to look behind that.
Counsel's opening remarks were somewhat incorrect in
regards to the state of the file.
ever filed.

There wasn't a counterclaim

What happened, within a matter of days, plaintiff

and defendant in this action each filed complaints, each
answered.

As I pointed out to you previously, there was some

inconsistencies, when you merged those two complaints and
answers together, when the Court consolidated those two files
in one pleading, I believe the defendants had alleged -excuse me, I believe the plaintiffs had alleged a sole
proprietorship, or a partnership.
was counter alleged.

In the other pleading, it

So there is some real inconsistencies.

I pointed those out to you, and they didn't sway you in terms
of where we were in this case.
But regarding the case in chief, we have the
affidavit of the defendant, which is in the file, which,
apparently, formed the basis of the Court's decision to enter
judgment in the amount that the judgment was entered for.
Nowhere in the file did Judge Fishier have the benefit of
examining the lease, which is the underlying document that the
plaintiff sued defendant on.

You have that marked as

6

1

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9, when we had the evidentiary

2

hearing.

3

because it is important that the Court look at that during the

I am wondering if it is still here in the file,

4 I course of these proceedings.
5 I

Anyway, be that as it may, I intend to this morning

6

cross-examine both plaintiffs about that lease.

I think you

7

will see, as we go through the testimony today, that nowhere

8

in that lease are the defendants, Mountain Equipment Sales and

9

Leasing, required under any circumstances to deliver title to

10

the plaintiffs, for any purpose, until they have paid the

11

balance of the residual on the lease.

12

the defendants —

13

indicated they accept the vehicle as is, that they agree,

14

throughout the course of this lease agreement, that plaintiffs

15

assume their own responsibility for any business losses they

16

may have in conjunction with this lease.

17

their cause of action is about.

18

And you will see that

the plaintiffs, by that lease document, have

Really, that's what

In the affidavit of the defendant Fred 0. Hays, that

19

formed the basis of Judge Pishler's decision to enter the

20

amount of the judgment, Fred 0. Hays indicates that the

21

defendant agreed to furnish the plaintiffs with good title to

22

the truck they were to lease, and to furnish good title, and

23

license the truck in the State of Wyoming.

24

other things.

25

It goes on to say

The lease is clear, and you are going to see that

the lease is clear, that it is the responsibility of the
lessee to license the vehicle, pay any licensing amounts, that
the lessee waives any claim he may have for loss of business
or loss of use or any other losses in conjunction with the
lease.

And you will further see that in plain language in

this lease, on page 1 of the document entitled "Warranty,"
which is made a part of the lease, "Until full payment of all
obligations of the purchaser hereunder, the seller reserves
title to ail equipment furnished hereunder."
Basically, I believe had Judge Fishier seen that
lease and heard the evidence in this case, other than this
affidavit of the plaintiff, he never would have entered a
judgment for that amount/ because it is clear under the lease
they are not entitled to that.

We will point that out to the

Court through testimony and through the introduction of that
lease into evidence today.
exhibit.

I believe it already is an

The copy I have is marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit

No, 9 from our last hearing.
MR. NIELSON:

May I respond briefly to that, your

Honor?
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. NIELSON:
counterclaim filed.
opposing counsel.

I stand corrected.

There was no

I agree with the scenario as indicated by
But he also made a misstatement, and that

was that the Court didn't have the lease.

The lease was

8

attached to the p -i a :t n 11 f t G ' compla int.

Now Mr . Kuhnhausen

wantB to reargue -THE COURT:

The Court is not going tu go back and

relitigate the decision rr, Juage Fishier.

The purpose of this

hearing, unless the Court misunderstood the position of both
counsel i

>•.-•:..:: * lis hearing, was to determine how much the

default judgme* * MR

. - :-t .

NIELSON:

That's correct.

MR. KUHNHAUSEN:

That's correct,

I think when ^t: talk about that

.; understand that.

I guess we have to look at

their prayer for relief in their complaint , ana 'ney have set
for'
* &,

Cuwu one of thrsjp causes c i action

I thjnt' we harr to

- cem one at a tune and see if they are entitled to rr-~ • --

for any of them.

I d -n't knuw we can establish the amount :;?

the judgment, an less jvu hear that; evidence.,

I don't hare --

I haven't looked at the Court's file to see whether or nu t
that was attached as an exhibit

Ma,/bt it was,

If It was,

that's helpfii! K: .ur. , because 1 t h i n ^ a fair reading of it
say:- they are not entitled to the things they were awardec
money for, such as "ax and
claimed

. ic en^^; njuney

loss i f business use
- \t:

.art's tile,

have

In that lease, if the Court

on page 2 of m e *^ase,

paragraph 9 •• • do you have that,
THE COURT

ae ttie\

udgi*"'

Taose documents are being broughr

MR. KUHNHAUSEN:

1 think the? 1--.-

-•

. v.,

-d to

plaintiffs1 complaint.

That might be way down in the file.

Maybe while we are waiting, if I can just point to the Court a
couple of these things, if you have that lease, I think that
will at least enlighten you as the evidence comes in today on
those damages.
MR. NIELSON:

I object to introducing any further

evidence, that it is res judicata.

The amount of the judgment

is on the face of the judgment, entered by the Court, signed
by Judge Fishier over five years ago.

I don't think it is

proper now to go back and inquire about the amount of the
judgment.

It is res judicata.

That should have been done

timely five years ago.
MR. KUHNHAUSEN:

We are here because you set it here

for an evidentiary hearing to determine it.

I think we are

here to show you how much, if any, plaintiffs' judgment ought
to be for.

We will concede plaintiff ought to be entitled to

$150, which is his lost tools he claims.

But beyond that, the

lease is clear, he is not entitled to any other damages.
THE COURT:

You may proceed.

The Court will

determine -- if at some point in time in the proceedings the
purpose of the hearing is being overextended, the Court will
notify counsel.

Have you established your prima facie case

with the request that the Court take judicial notice of the
documents

—
MR. NIELSON:

I believe we have.

10

THE COURT:
default

-- attendant

1udgme nt ?
MR. NIELSON:

1 beiipve so.

to introduce evidence relevan*
years age

If the Court

'wishes us

to the time five and a half

as to how the plaintiffs came up with this

amount —
is —

to the obtaining of the

•* course, the affidavit

the kind <

is already on file.

rigorous evidence that we would need

It
five

and a half years later does not exist.
THE COURT:
defenda:
will ask

The C

; ;• • ",-_;^eb that counsel for the

. t whom «-h
->;r. - questions cf

monitor *r

proceedings

wil ,1 * < •

\

defaul*

judgment was obtained,

* .e plaintiffs.

.-*"-

The Court will

, and determine where that

,. z v... „ resit?

MR. NIELSON:

I would call K:

Hay;<

at least have

him explain to the fmurt how we arrived at that, basically.
As I Indicate, since this was heard five and a half years ajo,
we were unable to come up with the rigorous kund of proof

that

we would have otherwIse done
THE COURT:
forth the affidavit

The documents are in the tile,

setting

of Fred 0. Hays; a letter dated June 26,

1986, from •\an,n"-. Medina to Judge Fishier, regarding the
default judgment; the judgment dated
Judge Fishier.
documents

The Court

-.;.y 3i

1996,, signed by

has fakpn judicial notice of those

Y:;«u may ca 11 your first w I tness .

FRED 0. HAYS,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the plaintiffs, being
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR, NIELSON;
Q.

Would you state your name and address, please.

A.

Fred 0. Hays, Green River, Wyoming, Box 734.

Q.

I show you a copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9.

This is an exhibit which has already been introduced into
evidence.

This is the lease in question.

I think your

testimony was, at the time of our other evidentiary hearing,
that you made a down payment on this truck.

Can you tell the

Court how you arrived at that down payment figure, and what
that figure is.
A.

The figure was arrived at by Mr. Kerry Smith, $1,700

in cash, and we traded a trailer in on it, allowed $4,000 for
the trailer.
Q.

Is that amount reflected on the lease itself?

A.

Yes, $5,700.

Q.

This represents a total down payment of $5,700?

A.

Right.

Q.

You alleged in your complaint that since you did not

have the proper licensing on this truck, you were not able to
use the truck from August of 1986 until December of 1986.
A.

1984, your Honor

—

12

Q.

Excuse me, 1984.

A

Yfb

U

1 believe you allege in /nur tGHipiaint that you

suffered damage? c i" O^O" per Gun

How cid you arrive at that

figure?
A,

It is based on rental rates of the truck at that

time. br-Twppn ;;MJ and $55 an hour, ten-hour days.
Q.

How many days per month?

A

Wi. ., j.1 W ouid vary

T Laser: A* on 20 days a month.

We :io oil f i 'd work, many, many times seven days a week.
Q.

You would have been involved m

oiJ field \ ^ork

tor

seven days a week?
A.

Mainly, yes,

Q.

You figured that that won i -i DV f'.>0 per hour, $500

per day?
A.

Right.

Q.

For 20 days per month?

A,

Yes r si r.

Q.

That's your gross income, is i'*

A-

Yes.

Q.

Against that, what expenses do you have?

A,

Approximately 50 percent.

Q

Who T rln

A

Fuel, tires, maintenance, taxes, which are very

f

hey , ons I s t o f ?

1 i 11J t? road and fuel work in our t ype o t wo,?; k,.

M :>s t I y of f -

13

1

highway.

2

Q.

How long have you been in the trucking business?

3

A.

Off and on all my life.

My father was in the

4

trucking business way before I was born.

I have been directly

5

associated with it since I was 15 years old.

6

Q.

Have you had your own trucking business?

7

A.

Well, I was basically a partner.

8
9
10

My son and I on

this one, we are partners on this one.
Q.

So you had occasion to figure profit and loss on

your operations?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Is it your testimony today that in this particular

13

kind of operation you would have derived approximately a 50-

14

percent profit?

15

A.

Yes, sir.

16

Q.

So that would be about $250 per day?

17

A.

Right.

18

Q.

And you had about

19

A.

As far as 70 days, I figured we were denied the use

20
21
22
23
24
25

—

of the truck.
Q.

Why were you —

what do you mean you were denied use

of the truck?
A.

Couldn't license it.

There is one thing I would

like to clarify.
MR. KUHNHAUSEN:

I ask that the witness1 remarks be

14

highway.
Q.

Ilun

icnj ncive you been in the trucking b u s i n e s s ?

A.

C M and on all

my .life

My father was in

trucking business way before 1 was born.

4

*ie

I have been directly

associated w i c h i t s in c e 1 was J 6 years old,
Q.

Have you had your own trucking business?

A.

Wei

this c.
Q.

I was basically a partner.

My 53on and I on

- e partners en this one.
So you had occasion to figure prof it and loss on

your operations?
A

Yes

Q.

"J s it your testimony today I hat. In this particular

kind c

Hrauori you would have derived approximately a 50-

percent profit?
A.

Yes, sir,

Q.

5 c t ill a 1, w ou J cl be about f; 2 S 0 p e r day ?
Right.
And y o u h a d about --

A.

As rar as id d a y s ,

I figured w e w e r e denied the u s e

of the truck,
Q.

Why were you

whnt do y o u m e a n y o u w e r e denied u s e

of the truck?
A.

C o u l d n f t 1 icense 2 1 . T h e r e ,1 s one th :I rig I woi 21 d

like to c l a r i f y .
Mn, K U H N H A U S E N :

I a s k that the w i t n e s s 1

remarks be

14

limited to the questions, your Honor.
THE COURT:
A.

Sustained.

We were not furnished a certificate of registration

or title, and the State of Wyoming requires a certificate of
title or a previous registration before you can buy a license
for a truck in the State of Wyoming.

I am sure Utah's must be

in the same category.
Q.

Under the lease you made the down payment of $5,700,

and you took possession of the truck?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And you took the truck to Wyoming?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

You were not able to run it over the road because it

was not licensed?
A.

That f s correct.

Q.

How many payments did you make under the lease?

A.

Two payments.

Q.

What did those total?

A.

2,000.

Q.

Was this figure $2,332.84?

A.

Yes.

Q.

The lease reflects one payment would be on a monthly

basis $1,166.42; is that correct?
A.

Right.

Q.

Two payments is $2,332.84.

You alleged in your

15

complaint that you lost $150 worth of tools when the truck' was
repossessed.
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Were those tools returned to you?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Did you pay some sales and use tax on this vehicle?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So it is your testimony today, as it was when this

There is $492 sa Ies tax.

judgment was entered, that the figure in the judgment is
proper and correct?
A.

I do.
MR. NIELSOK

That's a:I„ your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. KUHNHAUSEN:
Q

You testified that you have been in the trucking

business previously to entering into this lease agreement; is
that. r:ght?
Yes,
MR

sir.
NIELSON:

Mav I

just for the record, reflect a

continuing objection into going into the merits of the
Maybe I did t ha t pr evi^us 1y.

judgment.

MF

KUHNHAUSEN

' think: he waived that, Judge, by

his direct.
THE COURT:
fox: i:t le record.

Just

a

m\me; it,

Y o u r o b j e c t i o n is n o t e d

The Court indicated when it gave its

r u iing

18

1

that, because it was a default judgment, it was appropriate,

2

in equity, if for no other basis, to determine a fair amount

3

of the judgment, rather than set the judgment, in its

4

entirety, aside.

5

hour hearing.

6

Q.

That's what the Court will do in this one-

You may proceed.

You testified on direct examination that it cost you

7

$50 per hour for a ten-hour day for every day you didn't have

8

that truck; is that right?

9

A.

Yes, sir.

10

Q.

Do you have any evidence today to show any contracts

11

that you lost or any business that you lost, other than your

12

testimony?

13

A.

No, I have none.

14

Q.

You indicated that your costs were approximately 50

15

percent of the amount of the money that you would receive from

16

putting the truck to use for ten hours; is that right?

17

A.

That's correct.

18

Q.

You talked about tax, you talked about tires, fuel?

19

A.

Yes, sir.

20

Q.

What other expenses did you have in conjunction with

A.

Very little.

21
22

that?
We did all of our own maintenance, all

23

of our own tire repairs, we drove ourselves.

24

expense we had was for parts and fuel, oil, tires.

25

Q.

The only direct

That's all?

17

A

Yes ,

M_

Lidn't

v«'");,, n-ilsr i\irje

a lease

payment?

A

Yes.

Q.

Your lease payment was $1,166,42 per month?

k.

Correct.

Q.

II you divide that by 12, you get approximately $96

per day for the cost of the ase of tne vehicle; is that right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

So you have to add -- on top of your 50 percent, you

have to add another $96 per
A.

I would

Q.

I am going *

:o\.

*<- - with that.
:-:

*~ . -.

marked as Plaintiff's Exh
at :.Lat,

right?

Vou have i ~-?Y

what has been prev3,-usly

s
r

a^v you to take a look

-n. .t ^f

/. ,

Mr. Hays, is Plaintii* - Exhibit -.
pages -- is that
A.

Yes.

Q.

Tha T

/ nag^^ * ^u

A

„ i consists of ten
lave in yours?

encompasses the en tin" lca\*k

regarding thi* I (J 7 i

am sorry.

agreement

Fcra truck; is that right?

'To the best of my knowledge.
13 that, your signature
It

appearing on the cover sheet?

A.

YP!i

Q,

Did you also sign It over on page

A.

"Y e & , e i r .

JS.

oi i the fourth

page?

18

Q.

Did you also sign the document on the sixth page,

declaration of purpose?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

You also signed the document on the seventh page?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You had a chance to read this, did you not?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And you have experience in leasing trucks in the

past, in conjunction with your business?
A.

There is no disagreement with this lease agreement

as such.
Q.

My question is, do you have experience in leasing

other truclcs in conjunction with your business?
A.

Yes, I have.

Q.

You have had the occasion, prior to entering into

this lease, have you not, Mr. Hays, to license motor vehicles
in the State of Wyoming?
A.

Yes, sir.

But I had registration.

Q.

That calls for a yes or no answer.

A.

Yes.

Q.

So you had previous experience with the State of

Wyoming in licensing vehicles?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

You can read and write, can't you, Mr. Hays?

A.

Normally.

19

Q.

Did you read this document?

A.

which one°

Q.

Plaintiff's Exhibit Nc. 9.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Let's focuf; nr/v ..i, ihis document for lust a minute,

bu: ifcit'c gc back to your affidavit, dated the 19th day of
May, 1986, which previously has beei, marked as Defendants'
Exhibit B, and J t; is probably not in the Court's file, because
I have it here.

I am going to offer this exhibit.

MR. NIELSON:

't have any objection, other than

the objections 1 have already stated.
Q.

I want you to take a minute -

if you could.

-

-

r

idavit,

Havr von had a chance to read that?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Mr

Hays, there is a port ion of this, paragraph

unnumbered paragraph b, that has been crossed off,

—

Do you see

that?
A

Yes

Q.

1 *• at j,i€ af's. to say, "That the defendants agreed to

sir

pay the license and taxes due for the State of Wyoming which.
had to be paid by t he p1 ai n tif f s, 111 xhe sum G f S492,
that what

Is

IT says/
i

n viuus a T torney.

A

That's an inadvertent error by rn

Q.

There was i io agreement between you and the defendant

h

to pay for your taxes and licenses to the State of WvominqV1

1 I

A.

That's what I tried to explain a while ago when you

2

stopped me.

3

was no agreement they were to license the truck.

4 1

Q.

That was an error by my previous attorney.

There

You made this affidavit after your attorney told you

5

Judge Fishier wanted you to file an affidavit regarding

6

damages; is that right?

7

A.

Yes, sir.

8

Q.

You claim in unnumbered paragraph 3, "That the

9

defendant agreed to furnish the plaintiffs with good title to

10

the truck they were to lease and to furnish good title and

11

license the truck in the State of Wyoming within a few days.

12

That the defendant in fact did not have title to the truck,

13

and were unable to furnish title to the plaintiffs until about

14

December 12, 1984, making it impossible for the plaintiffs to

15

use the truck in their business prior to that date."

16

A.

Correct.

17

Q.

That was the truth then, and it is the truth now,

18

isn't it?

19

A.

Yes, sir.

20

Q.

I am going to ask you to look at that copy of

21

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9, and point out to me and for the

22

Court's benefit somewhere in that document where it says that

23

the defendant has an obligation to give you title.

24
25

MR. NIELSON:

I object to that, your Honor.

The

agreement speaks for itself.

21

THE COURT;
Q

.

Overruled.

me maki' M

t^i.-le. .

or maybe - ephrase it lor you

1 will withdraw my question,

Would you turn tu the page

says "Warranty," about four pages back, i ivt
A.

*VJ, JL

Q.

Will

' li... t

pages back.

* t.
:c ... look at paragraph 9 therein.

Take arciimte

tc read that.
A.

T r e a cl 11 .

Q.

That was part of the agreement, was it not?

A.

As tar as the tit; ,1c? is. concerned, that's part of the

agreement
Q.

\ej

sir.

P j d you eve r make i -.1 -. payment o f a ] ,3 ob 1 i g a t i ons

regarding this lease?
A.

N o , sir.

Q.

Let me ask you to turn your attention u? the page 2

of the lease, and paragrapa 'j

and ask you to re^d that.

A,

(The witness complies., )

Q.

Do you understand tha* paragraph' 1

A,

Vt-3

Q,

Y ou have t o speak audibly.

A.

Pardon?

Q.

You nave to speak audibly.

A.

Ye s, I unde rs t and.

Q^

That was pari of the agreement, also, was it not?

A.

Yes, cH~.

bir ,

Q.

Would you turn to page 7 of the agreement, a

document entitled "Addendum to Lease Agreement.1'

About

halfway down the page, or a third of the way down the page, it
says "Disclaimer."

Do you find that part?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Take a minute to read that, please.

A.

(The witness complies.)

Q.

Was that page part of the agreement?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now turn to the last page, please.

You have already

testified that your signature is on that page.
A.

Yes.

Q.

In the first paragraph, I want you to read the last

line, which begins with,
MR. NIELSON:

n

We accept."

We stipulate to these agreements.

There is no issue here.
THE COURT:

What is your objection?

THE WITNESS:

Which page is that on?

MR. KUHNHAUSEN:

Page 10.

(An off-the-record discussion was held.)
MR. NIELSON:
agreements.

We stipulate to the validity of the

I don't think it is proper for Counsel to make my

client read this agreement in open court.
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:

Do you understand the question?
Yes, sir.
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THE COURT:
Q.

Overruled.

At the time you entered into this lease, did you

accept the equipment as satisfactory in all respects for the
purpose of the lease?
A.

The equipment, I did, yes.

Q.

Did the defendants furnish you with a dump truck?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was it the same dump truck that was described in the

lease agreement?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You understand in your complaint, paragraph 4, you

complain that you didn't have proper registration, because the
lessor didnTt furnish it to you; is that right?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

I would like you to turn once again to your lease,

Exhibit 9, and go to page 2 of the lease, which would be
paragraph 4, the top of the page, says taxes, licensing,
registration.
A.

I agree with that.

That does not pertain to the

registration.
Q.

Can you show me anything in the lease where you rely

on a duty of the defendants, the lessors, to provide you with
any registration?
A.

That should be —

that's normally understood, that

they will -- registration is required before you can license

24

in any state.
Q.

You knew that, didn't you?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

You knew that about Wyoming?

A.

He promised me I would have registration in ten

days.
MR. KUHKHAUSEN:

I object, anything that is net

responsive to my questions, and that certainly wasn't, about
any promise, and would object for the further reason that it
goes beyond the lease, and he has testified that the lease is
the encompassment of their agreement.
THE COURT:
Q.

Overruled.

So, Mr. Hays

—

MR. NIELSON:

He may answer the question.

^e was

just about to say -THE COURT:

Do you have anything further to say on

that question?
THE WITNESS:

The only thing is, I agree with all of

this, with the exception that every state in the union I know
of requires a certificate of registration before you can
license a vehicle.
good.

If you can't license a vehicle, it is no

I wouldn't have bought it, if I had known I couldn't

get a registration.
Q.

The fact remains, doesn't it, that you agreed and

accepted this truck, signed this agreement, using your

25

expertise as a trucking person from Wyoming, having registered
trucks there before, vehicles there before, you just drove
away with this truck without any provision in the agreement
for the lessor defendants to provide you with title until you
paid for it, or any registration documents; is that right?
A.

He promised to send me a registration,

Q.

That's not my question.

My question calls for a yes

or no answer.
A.

Would you rephrase it, please.

Q.

It was a long, complicated question.
Mr. Hays, you signed this lease agreement, correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

The entire agreement you had?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Nowhere in the agreement does it say that the

defendants are required to give you a title?
A.

Doesn't say that, no.

Q.

Doesn't say they are required to give you any

registration documents, does it?
A.

Doesn't say that.

Q.

Based on your expertise as a trucking person, your

knowledge of the Wyoming registration laws from your past
experience, you drove away in the truck, right?
A.

Right.

Q.

You made a down payment?
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1

A.

Yes, sir.

2

Q.

You made two lease payments?

3

A.

Right.

4

Q.

You had the truck for how long?

5

A.

From the 30th of August until about the 10th or 12th

6 J of January.
Q.

How many days during that period of time did you

operate that truck?
A.

We didn't operate it.

Q.

Never?

A.

Just from here to the State of Wyoming.

Q.

So you had the truck for four months -- for six

months, and you made two lease payments?
A.

Right.

Q.

Pciid a down payment, and you are seeking a judgment

for $37,000?
A.

Right.
MR. KUKNHAUSEN:

Plus interest?

No further

questions, your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. NIELSON:

Anything?
Yes.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. NIELSON:
Q.

It is your testimony, is it not, that the

defendants, one of the defendants promised you that they would
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provide you with registration?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Who promised you that?

A.

Mr. Smith, Kerry Smith.

Q.

When was that promised?

A.

The day we left here with the truck.

Q.

What did he say?

A.

May I explain how this came about?

Q.

Tell me about the conversation between you and

Mr. Smith about the registration.
A.

We found out we couldn't get a trip permit to get

out of the State of Utah.
out about it.

I went back to Mr. Smith to find

He said they have an out-of-state title.

us a dealer's tag.

Gave

He said, "I will have you the registration

in ten days."
MR. KUHNHAUSEN:

I am going to make an objection.

This is all parol evidence, it shouldn't come in here today.
This document is clearly -- as plaintiff has testified, is the
sum of their agreement.

Any conversations or anything that's

not embodied in this document is irrelevant and inadmissible.
MR. NIELSON:
THE COURT:
Q.

This conversation came in after -Overruled.

You stated you tried to take the truck from the

State of Utah to the State of Wyoming, but you found out that
you couldn't do that.

How did you find that out?
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Q.

I am just asking you about your conversation with

Mr. Smith.
A.

He said,

,f

I will give you a dealer's tag to get it

into Wyoming, and I will have you the registration within ten
days."
Q.

Did he give you a dealer's tag?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

You took the truck to Wyoming?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What happened after that?

A.

Sent the dealer tag back to him, and waited on the

registration, which I never got.
Q.

Did Mr. Smith make a trip to Wyoming?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Did anyone from MESL make a trip to Wyoming?

A.

Mr. Ed Hill did.

Q.

When was that?

A.

In December, about the middle of December.

Q.

Was this trip to help you out with your

registration?
A.

He brought a title down.

He had a Wyoming title

made for the truck.
Q.

Do you remember the date when he went to Wyoming?

A.

I think it was the 12th of December.

Q.

12th of December?

30

A.

I believe.

Q-

Did you meet with him at that time?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Did you make an effort to get the truck registered?

A.

Yes, we did register it that day —

I beg your

pardon -- we didn't register it that day, because I didn't
have a sales agreement to show the price of the truck, so they
would know how much sales tax to charge, so I couldn't
register it.

I had to wait for a document showing what the

resale value of the truck was, before I could pay the sales
tax on it, which happened probably ten days later.
Q.

Did you ever get the truck registered?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Were you able ever to use the truck on the highways

of Wyoming?
A.

It was wintertime by then, 40 below zero, and the

work was all shut down by that time for the winter.
Q.

Did you attend the pretrial conference in this case

here in Salt Lake?
MR. KUHNHAUSEN:

I think the record reflects who

attended it.
THE COURT:
A.

Yes.

Overruled.

I beg your pardon.

Maybe I don't understand

the question.
Q.

At the time that your former attorney was going to

31

court to get this judgment entered, did you meet with the
judge here in Salt Lake?
A.

The day the judgment was awarded, I did, yes, sir.

Q.

Did you go to Judge Fishier's chambers, to his

court?
A.

Just in the courtroom.

Q.

Who was present?

A.

Judge Fishier; myself; and James Medlin, my former

attorney.
Q.

Do you recall those proceedings?

A.

Somewhat, yes.

Q.

Were you asked to give any oral testimony at that

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Did Mr. Medlin make an argument in your behalf?

A.

As far as I know, all this had been presented to the

time?

judge before I showed up there, as close as I can remember.
Q.

Why did you want to lease this truck?

A.

Well, we had lots of work for trucks at that time.

I had owned trucks previously.

It was a good opportunity to

make some good money with a truck.
Q.

What work was available when you took possession of

this truck?
A.

Several jobs:

road work, oil field construction

work, several contractors I worked for before, that were in
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1
2
3
4 1

need of trucks.
Q.

I realize it has been almost six years.

Do you

recall any of the names of these people?
A.

Shirl Brothers Construction for one, Debernardo

5

Construction out of Rock Springs, Sunrise Construction from

6

Rock Springs, Ted's Construction from Green River.

I worked

7 J for all of them at one time or another.
8
9

Q.

So it is your testimony that you had work and you

could have put this truck to use, had it been properly

10

registered?

11

A.

12

Yes, sir.
MR. NIELSON:

13
14
15

No further questions, your Honor.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. KUKNHAUSEN:
Q.

Did you ever drive to Salt Lake to obtain

16

registration for the truck, after you purchased it, before

17

Mr. Hill came up?

18

A.

I made about three trips down here.

19

Q.

Is it your testimony, and you would have this Court

20

believe that Wyoming was going to charge you a sales tax for a

21

transaction that took place in the State of Utah?

22
23
24
25

A.

Absolutely.

They charge sales tax on the license in

the State of Wyoming.
Q.

You testified by the time you got it registered, it

was too cold to work?
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1

A.

Right.

2

Q.

When did it get cold?

3 I

A.

December.

4

Q.

December what?

5

A.

Well, I don't know exact date.

6

of December.

7

Q.

It was in the month

You are asking the Court to give you $500 a day for

8

every day you couldn't use the truck.

9

at least at the time when you went to get the truck registered

10

with Mr. Hill, that you couldn't work that day, because it was

11

too cold.

12
13

A.

It was over 90 days before that, though.
MR. KUHNHAUSEN:

14

witness, your Honor.

15

THE COURT:

16

You have testified that

No further questions for this

Counsel will approach the bench.

You

may step down.

17

(An off-the-record discussion at the bench.)

18

(A recess was taken.)

19

THE COURT:

At the conclusion of the direct,

20

cross-examination, redirect and recross of the plaintiff

21

Fred 0. Hays, counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant

22

requested a recess to discuss a stipulated resolution of these

23

proceedings.,

Have you arrived at a stipulated solution?

24

MR. NIELS0N:

25

THE COURT:

I think we have, your Honor.
Read it into the record.
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MR. NIEL.5QU-: —The - judgment in behalf of the
plaintiffs and. against the defendants n&y be entered for
$15,000 plus interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum for
53 months.

The plaintiffs stipulate that they will not take

any action on the judgment for ten days, to permit the parties
to attempt to work out some sort of repayment schedule.
THE COURT:

Do the defendants, through counsel, so

stipulate?
MR. KUHNHAUSEN:

I only represent Mr. Hill.

only speak on behalf of him.

I can

He would agree that an equitable

amount of the judgment should be $15,000.

That doesn't waive

any claims he may have that he wasn't a partner, your Honor,
whether or not he received notice, and those other claims, for
the record.
MR. NIELSON:

I don f t know quite what that means.

MR. KUHNHAUSEN:

Means we are here today on an

evidentiary hearing, the Court would determine what the
judgment would have been had your --client -put on a case.

We

will agree that $15,000 is( a fair settlements- fair figure
for the judgment to be entered.

I don't know whether my

client will ever appeal the issue of whether the Court
determined him to be a partner, or not.

I don't think that's

really an issue that has to be linked to this judgment amount.
With that understanding, we would stipulate.
MR. NIELSON:

I think all he is saying is he
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1 I reserves the right to appeal
THE COURT:

2
3

He is entitled to that.

With that

clarification , does Mr. Hill so stipulate?

4

MR. HILL:

5

THE COURT:

Yes, that's fine.
It is so ordered.

To the defendant

6

Kerry G. Smith, have you been present in court during the

7

entire time the evidentiary hearing was held?

8

MR. SMITH:

Yes, I have

9

THE COURT:

Have you been present during the time

10

the stipulation was read into the record, regarding the

11

judgment?

12

MR. SMITH:

Yes, I have.

13

THE COURT:

Have you consulted in a nonattorney-

14

client capacity with other participants in this lawsuit?

15

MR. SMITH:

Yes.

16

THE COURT:

Do you understand what is being

18

MR. SMITH:

Yes, I do, your Honor.

19

THE COURT:

Do you so stipulate?

20

MR. SMITH:

Your Honor, I only have one problem with

17

proposed?

21

it.

22

$1,700 in cash, $4,000 in trade.

23

received, nor was cl ear title received.

24

to $11, 000 of the $15,000.

25

Of the $15,000, $5,700 of that shows down payment.
The $4,000 trade was never
So I would stipulate

(An off-the-record discussion was held.)
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THE COURT:

Do you so stipulate?

MR. SMITH:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Counsel for the plaintiff will prepare

an order and the stipulation.

Those documents are to be

submitted to the Court on or before January 23, 1991, for
signing and filing with the clerk.

The Court is hopeful that

a payment schedule that is acceptable to everyone can be
arrived at.
(This proceeding was concluded at 2:40 p.m.)
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